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Since the mid-1990s, major Japanese banks have sold off a significant portion of 
their holdings of corporate equity. Using information on the identity of Japanese 
firms’ top 10 shareholders, this paper explores the process of banks’ equity 
disposal. There is some evidence that, after FY2001, banks’ sales of equity 
accelerated, even holdings in firms for which the bank served as the main bank. 
However, affiliation with a main bank – proxied by firm-bank loan and 
shareholding ties – continues to be negatively associated with firm performance 
through FY2004. Regression estimates suggest that firms with strong bank ties are 
less profitable, face higher interest payments, and yet do not seem to enjoy lower 
stock price volatility than other firms. These effects are strongest for firms with a 
history of outside financing options, consistent with earlier arguments that the 
benefits of main bank relationships accrue to the banks themselves.   
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1. Introduction 
The Japanese financial sector has undergone significant changes since 2000. The number of 
major banking groups decreased from eight to four, with a wave of mergers in 2001-2002 and again in 
2005. The major Japanese banks, overall, returned to profitability in 2004 and 2005, and the non-
performing loan problem has largely been brought under control. Coincident with these changes, 
Japanese banks have continued to unwind their shareholding ties with corporate borrowers, a process 
which began in the mid-1990s. Since FY2000, equity holdings by major banks in Japan fell from close 
to ¥35 trillion to around ¥15 trillion by March 2006 (Bank of Japan (2006)). 
Large commercial banks have historically played an important corporate governance role in 
Japanese firms, and cross-shareholding ties were but one channel through which firm-bank 
relationships were maintained. Yet the significant changes in the size and structure of banks’ equity 
portfolios would suggest that the strength of the traditional main bank relationships has weakened, 
raising questions about whether Japan’s “main bank” system continues to function as it once did. Has 
banks’ disposal of corporate equity led to a loosening of the main bank ties? Do main banks continue 
to monitor client firms as they were reported to have done in the pre-bubble period? Do they, as some 
have argued, continue to extract rents from client firms? 
This paper adds to the growing body of work which attempts to address these questions. The 
analysis proceeds in three parts, and the focus is on the years FY2002–FY2004 (April 2002 to March 
2005) when Japanese banks came under increased scrutiny from regulatory authorities to address their 
non-performing loan (NPL) problems and to unwind their cross-shareholding relationships with client 
firms. In the first part, the mechanical process of banks’ share disposal is analysed using a database of 
the top 10 shareholders in Japanese firms. These data confirm that the size of banks’ equity portfolios 
decreased significantly between 1996 (when equity disposal began) and 2005, although the structure 
of these portfolios – judged by industry composition and firm characteristics – changed little over this 
period. As a result of banks’ equity disposal, rough firm-specific measures of bank affiliation indicate 
that fewer firms have what would have previously been characterised as a “main bank”, or a bank 
which is both a stable long-term lender and shareholder. In other words, in a mechanical sense at least, 
main bank ties seem to have loosened. 
The following section examines in more detail banks’ decision to sell corporate equity. Miyajima 
and Kuroki (2007) (hereafter MK2007) analyze in some detail the decision of banks to sell corporate 
equity in the 1995-2001 period, and find that banks’ were reluctant to dispose of shares of firms for 
which the bank served as the main bank (henceforth “client firms”). The question of interest here is 
whether banks’ equity disposal increased in and after FY2002 in the wake of increased regulatory 
scrutiny, and, if so, whether banks also unloaded shares of their client firms. Using an empirical 
framework similar to MK2007, the analysis suggests that banks remained reluctant to dispose of   2
shares in these firms, even after these banks returned to profitability in FY2004. That said, FY2002 
seems to have been an exceptional year when banks unloaded shares of all types of firms. 
To further explore the degree to which main bank relationships have weakened, the final section 
investigates whether the empirical relationships between bank affiliation and firm performance which 
were evident in the 1980s and early 1990s have persisted. There is a large literature which documents 
the supposed benefits and costs of Japan’s main bank system. Main banks were thought to serve as 
effective firm monitors, helping to solve many of the asymmetric information problems evident in 
more arms-length financial systems, and providing credit to firms in distress when other creditors 
would not. At the same time, one theme running throughout the large body of empirical work, 
discussed in more detail below, is that affiliation with a main bank (measured in a variety of ways) has 
been empirically associated with below average firm performance. For example, Nakatani (1984) finds 
a negative relationship between Keiretsu membership and firm profitability in the 1970s, while 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck et al. (2000) document similar results for the 1980s. More 
recently, MK2007 find a negative relationship between firm performance and bank affiliation for the 
1990s. 
One interpretation of these results is that banks had been able to use their market power to extract 
rents from their client firms. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck et al. (2000) document that bank-
affiliated firms often faced higher interest payments, but did not necessarily enjoy lower volatility, 
suggesting that the benefits of main bank relationships accrued to the main bank itself. Further 
supporting this hypothesis, Morck et al. (2000) show that the negative effects of ownership by the 
main bank on firm performance were stronger for bank-independent firms. In other words, the 
shareholding tie was perhaps a channel through which banks were able to extract rents from those 
firms which had outside financing options. 
A priori, it could be argued that the strength of these statistical relationships has weakened, or 
even disappeared, if banks’ disposal of corporate equity constituted a fundamental change in their 
relationships with client firms. This issue is examined for the FY2002–FY2004 period using a series 
of regressions of firm performance metrics on measures of the strength of the firm-bank tie (i.e. firm- 
and bank-specific shareholding and lending relationships) and control variables. Results at both the 
level of individual banking groups and by year suggest that the negative relationship between firm 
performance and bank affiliation has persisted through FY2004. Moreover, this negative relationship 
is larger and generally more significant for firms which historically have had access to the bond 
market, and thus considered to be the least bank dependent. Taken together, the results suggest that 
main bank relationships may not have weakened as much as banks’ significant disposal of corporate 
equity might suggest. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents further background on banks’ 
equity disposal and the changes in Japanese financial sector since 2000. The construction of the data 
set is discussed in section 3, followed by a discussion of how banks’ equity portfolios have changed   3
since 2000 in Section 4. Section 5 presents broad-level evidence on whether firm-bank ties are 
loosening, while the issue of bank affiliation and firm performance is addressed in Section 6. Section 7 
offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
2.1 Changes in the Japanese financial landscape 
The Japanese financial system has undergone enormous changes over the last decade. Mergers, 
restructuring of distressed banks, and bankruptcies had, by 2005, transformed the major financial 
groups centred around the large city and long-term credit banks (the so-called “financial Keiretsu” or 
“main bank” system) into four “mega-banks”.
1 In some cases, these mega-banks were created from 
mergers of banks which originally belonged to different financial Keiretsu groups.  
This process of consolidation in the financial sector occurred as banks were tackling their non-
performing loan (NPL) problems, which had become acute by the second half of the 1990s. As shown 
in Graph 1 (right-hand panel), banks’ negative profits in the late 1990s and again in FY2001-2002 
were the result of negative net income on “other” accounts, which includes loan loss provisioning and 
the write-off off non-performing loans. In March 2002, total NPLs – defined under the Financial 
Reconstruction Law as loans requiring special attention, doubtful loans and unrecoverable loans – 
reached ¥28.3 trillion for the major Japanese banks, or an estimated 8.7% of their total loans. By 
March 2005, NPLs had fallen to ¥7.6 trillion, or 2.9% of total loans (this then fell to 1.8% by March 
2006, and 1.5% in March 2007).
2 As credit costs associated with loan write offs fell, banks’ overall net 
profits rose to near zero in FY2003, and turned positive in FY2004 for the first time since FY2000.
3 
Bank profits hit an all time high in FY2005, before declining somewhat in FY2006.  
Since the mid-1990s, the major Japanese banks have been unloading their equity portfolios. As 
shown in the left-hand panel of Graph 1, holdings of corporate equity constituted roughly 8% of major 
banks’ total assets in the mid-1990s, but fell to 4% by FY2005.
4 These figures are based on mark-to-
market values, as recorded on banks’ balance sheets, and thus include valuation effects. For example, 
                                                      
1    The financial Keiretsu groups which existed until (at least) 1998 were centered around the following city banks: 
Sumitomo, Daiichi Kangyo, Sanwa, Tokai, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Asahi and Daiwa. 
2   Figures are taken from the Financial Services Agency: http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/regulated/npl/20060808.html  
3   Income from core operations, primarily lending, had actually remained relatively stable since FY1995, while fee-income 
has been on the rise. 
4   That said, concern about the market risk associated with banks equity holdings remains. For example, the Bank of 
Japan’s 2007 Financial Stability Review noted that this has become “…the largest component of risk bourne by the 
banking sector overall” (Bank of Japan (2007)).   4
the FY2000–FY2002 period, when this share dropped the most, was also a period of declining equity 
prices in Japan.
5 However, the (partial) data on banks’ corporate shareholding (described in more 
detail below) also indicate significant equity disposal by banks in these years.  
What are some of the factors behind banks’ disposal of corporate equity, in particular after 
FY2001? Consolidation within the banking sector, which accelerated after FY2000, played a role. 
Most of the major banking groups which existed in FY2005 experienced at least one merger of their 
core banks in the FY2001-FY2002 period. Since banks are not permitted to hold more than 5% of the 
outstanding equity of any client firm, the mergers themselves created selling pressures in cases where 
the combined equity holdings of the merged bank surpassed this threshold.
6 
Government initiatives aimed at structural reform of the financial sector also stimulate banks’ 
sale of equities. The “Law Regarding the Restriction of Banks’ Shareholding”, introduced in 
November 2001, required banks to reduce the value of their on-balance sheet equity holdings 
(excluding holdings shares of affiliates) to below their Tier I capital. The target date for compliance 
was originally set for September 2004, but later changed to September 2006, a deadline which the 
major banks were able to meet (Bank of Japan (2006)). In order to cushion the market impact of large 
equity sales, the Banks’ Shareholding Purchase Corporation (BSPC)
7 was created in January 2002 as a 
vehicle to purchase, and then later unload, banks’ corporate equity holdings. By April 2003, equity 
purchases by the BSPC totalled ¥218 billion. 
Finally, increased scrutiny from the regulatory community as banks’ capital adequacy worsened 
in FY2001 may have also been a factor. The sustained decline in equity prices in Japan in FY2000-
FY2002 increasingly put downward pressure on banks’ capital adequacy, since unrealized gains on 
equity holdings had, for the most part, disappeared by the end of FY2000, forcing banks to recognize 
losses with each equity sale. However, Capital adequacy ratios for the major banks fell to below 10% 
in FY2002, while Tier I capital adequacy ratios fell to around 5% for the major banks (Bank of Japan 
(2007)). Banks active use of deferred tax assets (DTA) to boost their Tier I capital,
8 and evidence 
                                                      
5   Between end-1998 and end-1999, the Nikkei 225 index rose by 50%, and then declined until early 2003. By end-2006, it 
was again up by 102%. 
6   Prior to 1977, banks were permitted to hold up to 10% of their client firms' outstanding shares. The Anti-Monopoly law 
of 1977 gave banks a ten year window to reduce this to 5%. Banks were given some time to reduce their holdings when 
5% ceiling was breached following bank mergers. 
7   See http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/e20010626-1.html for details. 
8   Major Japanese banks recorded ¥8.1 trillion in DTAs at end-March 2002, constituting approximately 47% of Tier 1 
capital. See BIS (2002) for background. Skinner (2005) argues that, since DTAs are very subjective, managers had 
considerable discretion in calculating their value, and used these to smooth earnings and massage capital values.   5
suggesting that banks were “evergreening” loans to arguably insolvent borrowers,
9 put banks’ capital 
adequacy further in doubt.  
As equity prices continued to fall in the Autumn of 2002, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
assembled a task force in October, under the direction of Heizo Takenaka, which made demands for 
improvements in NPL disposal and banks’ corporate governance. This task force proposed (1) a 
further tightening of loan classification and provisioning standards, (2) stricter evaluation of the 
treatment of DTAs and (3) a scheme for injecting public funds into weak but solvent banks (via the 
Deposit Insurance Law). These measures, widely covered in the media, were geared at forcing banks 
to recognize losses in calculating their capital bases. 
Shortly thereafter, in November 2002, the Bank of Japan announced its intention to purchase 
corporate equities from commercial banks under the “bank share purchase program”. Although the 
terms of this program placed performance and credit risk limits on the shares that the Bank of Japan 
would acquire, it was aimed at helping banks’ dispose of their equities with a minimal impact on 
overall stock market prices. Although banks were initially reluctant to sell their shares, banks began to 
unload a portion of their shareholding as equity markets picked up over the course of FY2003. By the 
end of FY2003, the total market value of shares purchased under this program reached ¥1.8 trillion. 
2.2 Firm-bank ties in Japan 
Main bank relationships typically operated through three channels: a) lending ties, b) 
shareholding ties, and c) the placement of directors by the bank on the firm's board. Many empirical 
studies have demonstrated that these channels give banks a strong voice in the corporate governance 
structure of the bank.
10 However, banks’ disposal of equity means that, potentially, at least one of 
these channels has weakened. 
Much of the early literature argued that main bank relationships helped to solve asymmetric 
information problems. Because of their insider knowledge, main banks stood ready to provide credit to 
client firms during periods of distress or when other lenders would not, thus helping firms reach their 
first-best investment path (Aoki (1994), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990)). For example, Hoshi, 
                                                      
9   See Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Kobayashi et al. (2002). Caballero et al. (2006) find that the percentage of firms 
receiving subsidized loans – the so called “zombie firms” – was as high as 15% in 2002, compared with 1-6% between 
1981 and 1991. 
10   Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) present evidence that placing bank personnel 
on the board of directors of client firms helps those firms that enter financial distress return to profitability more quickly. 
Morck and Nakamura (1999), Prowse (1990, 1992) and Sheard (1989) provide evidence that cross shareholding between 
firms and banks is driven less by profit maximizing portfolio management, and more by an incentive to take shares off 
the market to prevent corporate takeovers. Sheard (1994) argued that main banks implicitly directed and guaranteed loans 
by other creditors, presumably other financial institutions within the same financial group, thus magnifying the main 
bank's role as creditor.   6
Kashyap and Sharfstein (1991) found that bank affiliated firms had lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity than non-affiliated firms in the 1980s, supporting the hypothesis that main banks helped to 
solve the asymmetric information problems which can arise in arms-length financing arrangements. 
The alleged benefits of the main bank system were challenged in later work as the health of the 
Japanese financial system deteriorated in the 1990s.
11 One strand of this literature has attempted to 
empirically pin down whether bank affiliation has been a net-positive for client firms.
12 On the one 
hand, a dual shareholding-lending relationship with a client firms may actually help to align the 
incentives of the various claimants of firm revenue. That is, when a creditor holds equity in a client 
firm, the incentive to extract surplus through the debt relationship should be reduced, since 
expropriation reduces the return on equity. On the other hand, the lack of a fully developed bond 
market meant that, for many years, banks had enjoyed significant market power in the intermediation 
of credit in Japan, meaning their role as creditors was, arguably, larger than their role as shareholders. 
If the benefits to the bank from holding equity are small relative to their debt interests, equity 
ownership may simply enhance rent extracting behaviour by giving the bank an extra toehold. As 
argued by Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) "...maximization of the value of the client firms' 
equity might have a low weight in the objective function for Japanese banks, compared to the 
maximization of the value of their debt claims" (p. 543). 
Early work on firm performance seemed to indicate that main banks were a source of stability for 
their client firms. Nakatani (1984), using data from the 1960's and 1970's classified firms as either 
bank affiliated or independent, and found that membership in a Keiretsu group was associated with 
lower profitability of client firms, but also with lower variance of profitability. That is, firms enjoyed 
greater stability with a main bank, but may have paid a premium for it. In a later test, Horiuchi et al. 
(1988) examined whether main banks actually contributed to offsetting movements in the operating 
performance of firms, but found no evidence of such risk sharing behavior.  
Later work lent some support to the view that the benefits of main bank relationships accrued to 
the banks themselves, at least for certain sub-samples of borrowing firms and in certain time periods.
13 
Kang and Shivdasani (1999) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1995, 1998), using data from the 1980s, found 
that bank affiliated firms performed worse than independent firms on a variety of profitability 
                                                      
11   Looking again at firm investment, Gibson (1995, 1997) found that poor health of the main bank reduced investment by as 
much as 30% in some firms. 
12   Agarwal and Elston (2001) investigate bank-firm relationships in Germany, and find that interest payments are higher for 
bank affiliated firms. They fail to find evidence, however, that affiliated firms enjoy higher profitability or growth, and 
conclude that banks engage in rent seeking behaviour.  
13   Sher (2001) cites survey results that corporate executives “…generally saw the main bank relationship as lacking the 
benefits it purportedly accords the firm”, and results from surveys of bank practitioners suggesting that “…although 
benefits of the relationship may have been perceived as doubtful by the client, the bankers believed the relationship was 
quite profitable for the bank” (p. 10).   7
measures. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) went on to show that not only did bank affiliated firms face 
higher interest payments, they did not enjoy lower volatility of profits.
14 Morck et al. (2000), relying 
on data for 373 firms in 1986, showed that average Q is negatively correlated with bank ownership. 
Moreover, they found that these empirical relationships were strongest for those firms which had 
outside financing options, consistent with the hypothesis that banks used the shareholding channel to 
extract rents from client firms. The evidence for more recent periods suggests that bank affiliated firms 
have continued to under-perform; MK2007, for example, find that the negative relationship between 
bank ties and firm performance is evident in the 1990s as well. 
The analysis below revisits these issues using firm-bank relationship data through FY2004 
(March 2005). Firm-bank ties have, in a mechanical sense, loosened considerably as banks have 
reduced their corporate shareholding. The following two sections attempt to quantify these changes in 
banks’ equity portfolios, and the degree to which firm-bank ties have loosened after FY2001. Section 
6 then provides more recent evidence on the relationship between three firm performance metrics – 
profitability, interest payments and stock price volatility – and bank affiliation, and does so separately 
for different groups of firms (those with and without a history of bond financing). 
3. The Data  
The analysis rests on a panel dataset which links individual firms and banks. The primary source 
of data is the “Kaigin financial database” from the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ). These data are 
based on the yukashoken hokokusho, and contain detailed annual accounting data on all non-financial 
firms listed on the various stock exchanges in Japan. 
Firm-bank relationships are captured by information on both the firms’ lending ties to banks, and 
by banks’ holding of firm equity. Firm-bank-specific data on outstanding loan balances is taken from 
Financial Quest and supplemented with similar loan data from the Kaigin database (available until 
1999). For the shareholding data, the Kaigin database includes information on the identity and 
shareholding rate of the top 10 shareholders for each firm in each year since 1982.
15 It should be 
pointed out that this provides a less complete picture of shareholding relationships than that in the data 
used in MK2007, since their data contains (1) information on the top 20 shareholders and (2) 
information on the holding of bank shares by corporations, and can thus be used to investigate the 
                                                      
14  Beason (1999), taking a different approach, used high-frequency stock price data for bank affiliated and independent 
firms and measured whether stock price volatility is lower for the former group. He found no evidence that this is the case. 
15   Firms list the name of the individual or corporate shareholders (in Japanese). There are many coding irregularities across 
firms and years, making the data difficult to use without substantial cleaning. Any errors in this cleaning process are 
those of the author.   8
bilateral nature of the unwinding process. That said, one goal of this study is to see just how well the 
unwinding process is captured in the Kaigin data, which is used by many researchers. Moreover, the 
data is arguably sufficient to track changes in the (unidirectional) strength of ties with main banks 
since, as described in more detail below.  
To get a sense of whether the data is sufficiently representative, the following two sections (4 and 
5) explore the properties of this shareholding data, and track the changes in the strength of firm-bank 
ties using a variety of metrics. In section 4, estimates of the market value of banks’ equity portfolios 
are constructed by summing a particular bank’s holding of shares across firms in a particular year. 
These portfolios are then compared with the market value of banks’ equity holdings, as listed on their 
balance sheets and, in section 5, are used to analyse the determinants of banks’ decisions to sell equity 
in particular firms. 
Admittedly, the estimated bank equity portfolios constructed for this exercise provide an 
incomplete picture of banks’ true equity portfolios for a number of reasons. First, not all firms’ 
accounting periods end in March (about 18% do not), making it impossible to get a precise point-in-
time estimate of a banks’ equity portfolio.
16  Second, holdings of shares of firms which are not 
included in the Kaigin data, or of firms for which the bank is not in the top ten shareholders, will not 
be captured.
17 Thus, the equity portfolios constructed here represent, at best, a lower bound on the 
market value of banks’ true portfolios. 
To supplement this firm-bank relationship data, a measure of firms’ Keiretsu affiliation is taken 
from the 1982-1999 editions of Dodwell Marketing Consultants “Industrial Groupings in Japan”. A 
firm is classified as a “Keiretsu member” if it appeared in Dodwell’s rosters in at least half the editions 
published between 1982 and 1999, and independent otherwise. While the primary goal is to investigate 
firm-bank relationships independent of the Keiretsu dummy, this is an important control variable in 
that it has often been the foundation of previous studies of bank affiliation and firm performance. 
Finally, this analysis also relies on annual measures of each firm’s stock market return, beta and 
idiosyncratic risk. These are calculated from daily stock price data taken from Bloomberg, and 
supplemented with data from Nikkei NEEDS (which contains information on dead firms). Alternative 
estimates of firms’ stock price beta and idiosyncratic risk are calculated using the standard market 
model (with the return on the Nikkei 225 as a proxy for the market return), as well as a three factor 
model, which also includes the yen/dollar exchange rate and changes in the long term interest rate. 
                                                      
16   For most firms, the financial year ends in March. The fiscal year (FY) for a particular observation is the previous year if 
the firm files before June, and the current year if the firm files after June. 
17   Specifically, banks’ holding of shares of other banks, trust banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions 
are not captured, nor is banks’ holdings of foreign shares, since these institutions are not included in the Kaigin database.   9
4. A picture of banks’ equity portfolios 
Overall, the cleaned shareholding data in the Kaigin database shows a significant decline in 
equity ownership by major Japanese banks, consistent with more aggregate measures banks’ equity 
holdings. This can be seen by looking at changes in the estimated number of shares held by individual 
banking groups, as well as changes in the estimated market value of these banks’ equity portfolios. 
Graph 2.1 provides a broad overview of the Kaigin shareholding data, broken down by type of 
financial institution. By FY2000, the number of shares held by city banks (in firms for which these 
banks were amongst the top 10 shareholders) was 20% less than that in FY1996.
18 By FY2004, this 
number had dropped by more than 60% of the 1996 value. Similarly, trust banks’ holdings fell an 
estimated 80% over this same period, while holdings by life insurance companies, which started to 
decline earlier, in FY1994, fell by roughly 60%.
19  
In contrast, the Kaigin shareholding data indicate that the number of shares held by some other 
types of financial institutions in Japan have either remained stable, or have grown. Estimated holdings 
by regional banks (which have far less often been amongst the top 10 shareholders) and the fire and 
marine insurance companies decreased only modestly between FY1996-FY2004. At the same time, 
ownership by foreign headquartered banks has shown a steady increase since the 1990s.
20 
How have individual banks’ equity portfolios evolved since the mid-1990s? Addressing this 
question directly is problematic since so many banks merged over the last decade, although Graphs 
2.2-2.4 attempt to shed some light on this issue. They illustrate the consolidation in the financial sector, 
as represented in the information on firms’ top 10 shareholders. The vertical axis in each panel is the 
number of firms in the Kaigin database which list an individual bank as one of the top 10 shareholders. 
Across the panels, individual banks are grouped under the name of the so-called “mega-bank” which 
had emerged by 2006.
21 Fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were important in terms of merger activity, as all 
                                                      
18   Of course, individual banks may drop out of the list of a firm’s top 10 shareholders because of only a partial sale of 
shares, or because another shareholder pushes them out, even when the bank did not actually sell any shares. The 
estimates throughout this paper assume that when a bank drops out of the list of top 10 shareholders for a particular firm, 
its holdings of shares in that firm are zero. The raw data is adjusted to reduce noise. For example, observations where the 
bank does not appear in the top ten shareholders in period t, but where the banks’ shareholding rates in period t-1 and 
period t+1 are positive and identical, are set equal to the positive rate. 
19   The spike evident for trust banks in FY2001 corresponds to the merger of Mitsubishi Trust, Nippon Trust and Tokyo 
Trust banks in October 2001, and the creation of UFJ Trust bank from Tokai Trust and Toyo Trust banks in January 2002. 
20   Observations in the Kaigin data often indicated whether shares were held on the bank’s balance sheet (“own account”) or 
on “customer account”. To the extent possible, “customer account” holdings were excluded from the estimates of 
Japanese trust banks’ equity portfolios, although there are some data irregularities which suggest that a portion of the 
identified “own account” holdings by trust banks is actually holdings on “customer account”. For foreign banks, no such 
separation was feasible; much of the rise in Graph 2.1 for foreign banks probably reflects greater “customer account” 
ownership. 
21   The construction of these bank groups was partially driven by the data. For example, Mizuho bank and Mizuho Corporate 
bank are combined in this analysis under the name “Mizuho”, since the division of equity across the two banks following 
   10
major banking groups, with the exception of Aozora and Shinsei banks, experienced at least one 
merger of their core banks in these years. A handful of city banks which existed in 1995 were the 
largest shareholding institutions in each of the major groups, whereas (estimated “own account”) 
holdings by the trust banks and holdings by regional banks which were ultimately consolidated in the 
mega-bank were relatively small by comparison. 
These figures indicate that the mega-banks were much less likely to be listed in the top ten 
shareholders in 2004 than a decade earlier. For example, the number of firms listing Tokyo Mitsubishi 
UFJ (or one of its’ legacy banks) amongst its top ten shareholders decreased from 1390 firms, or 56% 
of all listed non-financial firms, in FY1996, to 741 firms, or 32%, in FY2004 (Graph 2.2). Mizuho was 
listed by 1314 firms (52%) in FY1996, but only by 705 firms (30%) in FY2004. A similar patter is 
evident for Sumitomo Mitsui, Resona, Shinsei and Aozora (Graphs 2.3 and 2.4). This simple measure 
suggests that firm-bank relationships, which appeared stable prior to around FY1997 for most of the 
mega-banks, have loosened considerably over the last decade. 
The shareholding patterns observed in the Kaigin data seem to track fairly well the information 
on equity holdings contained in banks’ balance sheet data, at least for the four mega-banks. Graph 2.5 
presents a (lower-bound) estimate of the market value of individual banks’ equity portfolios, 
calculated by multiplying the estimated number of shares held in each firm by the firm’s end-of-period 
stock price. The red line in each panel traces the market value of banks’ equity holdings, constructed 
by adding up figures from individual banks’ balance sheets for each mega-bank.
22 The difference 
between the estimated market value (bars) and the actual market value (line) of banks’ equity 
portfolios reflects differences in valuation methodologies, as well as holdings in firms that are not 
included in the Kaigin data. These figures suggest that the patterns observed in the Kaigin database are 
probably representative for city banks. However, similar figures (not presented) for the former long 
term credit banks and the trust banks are much less convincing. In part, this reflects the difficulty in 
determining which shares are held as part of investment trusts (i.e. on customer accounts), and which 
are held by these banks themselves.  
Even as banks disposed of corporate equity, there is some evidence that, at a broad level, the 
cross-sectional  structure of their portfolios changed little. That is, there seems to be only small 
changes in the industry composition of the mega-banks’ equity portfolios between FY1996 and 
FY2003, suggesting that banks disposed of equity across a wide range of industries rather than in a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the merger of Daiichi Kangyo, Fuji and IBJ is unclear. Similarly, Resona Trust is combined with Resona Bank because it 
is unclear how the equity holdings of Daiwa bank were divided. The merger of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and UFJ occurred after 
the end of the Kaigin data sample, although the combined Mitsubishi Tokyo UFJ banking group is used for convenience. 
Graphs similar to 2.2-2.4 for trust banks are available upon request. 
22   Bank balance sheet data is taken from the Nikkei NEEDS database.   11
targeted few.
 23 Table 1.1 presents an industry breakdown of the shares held in the four hypothetical 
bank portfolios. The estimated holdings (in terms of numbers of shares) in particular industries 
contracted significantly between FY1996 and FY2003, typically by 40-60%.
24 In only one industry 
(mining) did the estimated number of shares held by these banks increase. At the same time, the 
industry-level composition changed relatively little; the estimated change in the portfolio weights for 
most industries, calculated using both current and constant equity prices in order to partially control 
for the valuation effects, change by less than one percentage point over this period.
25 
5. Loosening bank ties? 
Has banks’ equity disposal gone hand-in-hand with a loosening of “main bank” relationships in 
Japan? This section explores this question by presenting various measures of firm-bank affiliation and 
tracking their evolution over time. It also re-examines the determinants of a bank’s decision to sell 
corporate equity. MK2007 explored this issue in depth for the FY1997-FY2001 period, and found that 
a bank’s decision to sell shares was negatively associated with measures of the strength of the firm-
bank tie. Using a similar empirical methodology, the question of whether banks remained reluctant to 
dispose of shares of their close client firms in the FY2002-FY2004 period, when scrutiny from the 
media and the FSA put increased pressure on banks to reform their balance sheets, is addressed.  
At a broad and fairly mechanical level, there is some evidence that firm-bank ties have started to 
loosen. Table 2.1 lists the average number of lending relationships and the average number of times 
banks appear amongst the top 10 shareholders for the dataset as a whole.
26 Since FY1996, the average 
number of lenders per firm fell from just over eight to just under six in FY2004. Similarly, the average 
number of banks amongst the top 10 shareholders fell from almost four to just over two over this same 
period. The final column of Table 2.1 shows that the percentage of lenders that are also amongst a 
                                                      
23   The data for FY2004 in the version of the Kaigin database used here do not include firms with an accounting period that 
ended later than end-March 2005 (about 15% of all firms). Calculations based on the data for FY2004 are qualitatively 
similar to those presented below. 
24   Across portfolios, the average reduction in the number of shares held in each industry was 53% over this period. Banks 
that drop out of the list of top ten shareholders are assumed to have zero shareholding. Thus, the figures on the percent 
decrease in share holding will overstate the actual decrease to the extent that shareholding by these banks is still positive. 
25   Current value portfolio weights use the firm’s end-of-period stock price to value the banks equity holdings in a particular 
year. In contrast, Constant value weights are constructed using the FY2003 end-of-period stock prices to value holdings 
in a particular firm in all years. 
26   The figures in this table are calculated after consolidating total loans  and shareholding (for each firm) across the groups 
of banks which ultimately merged into one of the four mega-banks. This understates the actual number of lending and 
shareholding relationships in years prior to bank mergers, but captures changes in the number of these relationships 
independent of the bank merger process.   12
firm’s top ten shareholders declined as well, from 91% of all firm-bank lending pairs in FY1996 to 
65% in FY2004. 
To more formally address the question of whether “main bank” ties are loosening, it is necessary 
to first identify each firm’s main bank. A variety of methodologies have been used in the literature, 
some as simple as Keiretsu affiliation, and other, more sophisticated procedures which make use of 
firm-bank-year specific lending data. The four step procedure used here combines this lending data 
with the shareholding data in the Kaigin database, and is detailed in Table 2.2.
27 The first step is to 
identify banks which are both the firm’s largest lender and the largest shareholder among banks 
(criteria 1).  If no bank satisfies this criteria, then the firm’s main bank is next chosen as the largest 
lender which is also one of the top five shareholders among banks (criteria 2). If no bank satisfies this 
criteria, the bank which is the largest shareholder and is amongst the top five lending banks is chosen 
(criteria 3). Finally, if a main bank has still not been identified, then the firm’s largest lending bank, 
regardless of its shareholding in the firm, is selected (criteria 4). 
Although mechanical, this selection procedure does provide a rough indication of how firm-bank 
relationships, when measured by the loan and shareholding channels, have changed over the last ten 
years. As shown in Table 2.2, banks identified as the firm’s largest lender still tend to be identified as 
the largest bank shareholder as well (criteria 1), at least for the four mega-bank groups. However, the 
number of firm-bank pairs which meet this criteria has fallen over the last decade, as banks have 
reduced their holding of corporate shares. Similarly, the number of firm-bank pairs which meet the 
slightly less restrictive criteria 2 has also fallen for the four major banking groups. As a result, the 
number of banks which are selected as main banks based solely on the lending data (criteria 4) has 
been on the rise. Combined, these figures provide some evidence that the incidence of individual 
banks holding the top lending and shareholding positions (amongst banks) is no longer as common as 
it once was, and, to the extent that firms’ actual main banks are identified, suggests a weakening of 
main bank ties. 
Following a methodology similar to that in MK2007, the remainder of this section relies on a 
probit model to explore the determinants of banks’ decision to sell equity, with a focus on sales of 
shares of firms for which the bank serves as the main bank. The dependent variable in these 
regressions, SDUM, is a dummy which attempts to capture the sale of shares by a particular bank in a 
particular firm in a particular year. To construct this variable, all firm-year observations for which the 
                                                      
27   Consolidation in Japan’s financial industry since the mid-1990s presents a problem since many banks which were once 
separate “main banks” for different stables of firms later merged. In selecting each firm’s main bank, the unconsolidated 
loan and shareholding data are used to select the bank, and then the name of the bank is changed to the name of the mega-
bank which ultimately emerged after the merger process.   13
mega-bank is listed as a shareholder are selected.
28 Conditional on the particular bank holding shares 
in period t-1, SDUM is set to one in period t if the number of shares held in period t is less than the 
number held in period t-1.
29  
Looking only at the statistical properties of SDUM, there is evidence of a pick-up in the rate at 
which main banks disposed of shares of their main-bank client firms after FY2000. Table 2.3 provides 
a breakdown of this variable for observations where one of the banks in each mega-bank has been 
identified as a firm’s main bank.
30 The first column under each bank name lists the total number of 
firms for which the bank was identified as the main bank. The second column lists the share of these 
firms for which SDUM=1, or where a sale of shares has been identified. For each of the four mega-
banks, this share steadily picked up after FY2000. The highest incidence of sales occurred in FY2002 
and FY2003, when banks’ solvency came under increased scrutiny. Banks disposed of shares in an 
estimated 30-50% of the firms for which they served as the main bank in these years, although the 
incidence of sales dropped in FY2004. 
The dummy, SDUM, is regressed on a host of firm-specific, bank-specific and firm-bank-specific 
right hand side (RHS) variables. The first set of RHS regressors are meant to capture firm performance. 
These are included to test whether or not banks have sold off their “high performing” shares, and 
whether the sale of such shares accelerated in FY2002 as banks became increasingly capital 
constrained. The firm’s stock performance is captured by current and lagged values of the one year 
return on the firm’s stock in excess of the return on the NKY225 index (EXRET), and by lags of year-
specific estimates of the firm’s market beta (BETA) and idiosyncratic risk (IRISK). A lag of the ratio of 
total bank loans to total liabilities (TLN_TL) is included to capture the firm’s overall debt structure and 
level of bank dependence, and average Q (Ave Q) is included to capture the market’s assessment of a 
firms’ investment opportunities.
31 
Banks in poor health arguably faced a greater need for liquidity to boost their capital ratios, and 
thus were under greater pressure to dispose of shares. To control for these effects, bank-specific 
                                                      
28   The analysis is based on the hypothetical portfolios for the following four mega-banks: Mizuho, Sumitomo Mitsui, 
Resona and Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ. 
29   The number of shares held is calculated as the product of the shareholding rate (in the Kaigin data) and the number of 
shares outstanding for a particular firm. To reduce the effect of noise, the dummy is set to 1 only if the reduction in shares 
held is larger than 1% of the t-1 level. Cases where the number of shares held by a particular bank in a particular firm in 
period t-1 is positive but for period t is unknown (because the bank either sold its shares was no longer listed as one of 
the top ten shareholders) are treated as a sale of shares, and SDUM is set to one. 
30   The numbers for each of the four mega-banks in Table 2.3 differ from those in Table 2.2 because firm-year observations 
where one or more of the variables needed for the probit regressions presented below are missing have been dropped. 
31   Average Q is constructed using a slightly modified procedure from Hayashi and Inoue (1991). Other firm-specific 
regressors include a lag of total assets (TA), a lag of the log of the interest coverage ratio (lnCOVRAT), dummies which 
are set to one if the number of outstanding shares decreased (NOSHDEC) or increased (NOSHINC) in a particular year, a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the bank’s shareholding rate in the previous year was greater than 5% (FIVE) and a 
full set of industry dummies.   14
variables are also included. A lag of BTA, or total assets of the mega-bank, is used to capture bank size, 
and current and lagged values of BNETINCTA, or the mega-banks’ net income scaled by total assets, is 
used to proxy for bank health.
32 In addition to these variables, the regressions include dummies for 
each of the four mega-banks to control for unobserved bank-specific effects. 
The regressors of interest are those which capture the strength of the firm-bank relationship.
33 In 
particular, the regression includes the dummy variable TOP, which equals one if the bank was 
identified as the firm’s “main bank” in the previous year using the four step procedure described above. 
Changes in the sign and significance of the coefficient on TOP across years should provide some 
indication as to whether the increase in the incidence of share sales in these firms after FY2001, as 
indicated in Table 2.3, actually represented a loosening of main bank ties or rather was the result of 
other factors. In addition to TOP, a lag of the share of the firm’s total loans which were extended by 
the shareholding bank (TLNSHARE) is used as an additional proxy for the strength of the firm-bank tie. 
Note that TLNSHARE captures this firm-bank lending tie regardless of whether the bank is identified 
as the firm’s main bank, as captured by TOP. 
Table 2.4 presents the results of regressions based on observations pooled across firms and mega-
bank portfolios. The RHS variables have been added sequentially, yielding five different model 
specifications across the columns of Table 2.4. The coefficients are presented as the marginal change 
in the probability of a sale for an infinitesimal change in the regressor, and for a discrete change in 
dummy variables. Three broad points stand out in these results. First, banks’ decision to sell equity 
was strongly related to firms’ stock price performance. Banks tended to sell those shares which 
outperformed the market in either the current or previous period, as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficients on the EXRET variables. In doing so, they were more likely to dispose of “high 
beta” shares. Second, the larger the bank and the higher the bank’s net income in the current period, 
the less likely the bank was to realize a sale, consistent with the idea that deteriorating bank health 
contributed to the rising incidence of share sales. Finally, across all specifications, the variable TOP 
enters negatively and significantly, indicating that banks were, overall, reluctant to sell shares in those 
firms for which they served as the main bank. Being the firms’ main bank in period t-1 reduced the 
probability of a sale of shares in a client firm by roughly 5-6 percentage points. 
Repeating this exercise on a year-by-year basis provides some evidence that FY2002 was a 
watershed year (Table 2.5).
34 As equity markets fell and the NPL problem worsened through FY2002, 
                                                      
32   These are constructed by first aggregating individual bank balance sheets to the level of the mega-bank. 
33   One drawback of the current analysis is that there is no information on firms’ holding of banks’ shares. This information 
allowed MK2007 to examine the bilateral nature of the unwinding process. While this omission is not without cost, it is 
unlikely to affect the overall point of the analysis presented here. 
34   The regressions in Table 2.5 are based on Model 5 in Table 2.4. However, the bank-specific variables have been dropped. 
Regression include sets of mega-bank and industry dummies. To save space, only the coefficient estimates for six 
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banks faced a growing need for cash to support their capital ratios. A reading of the coefficients on the 
variables tracking the firms’ stock price performance (i.e. EXRET, BETA and IRISK) suggests that 
banks sold shares of firms which outperformed the market, particularly in FY2001 and FY2002. The 
size and the significance of the coefficient on EXRET rises in these years (and then declines through 
FY2004), indicating that banks may have “cashed in”, driven by their need to boost capital adequacy. 
However, with falling equity prices overall in these years, it may also reflect banks’ reluctance to sell 
those shares requiring the recognition of a large capital loss. Banks also tended to sell off high beta 
stocks in these years, which may have helped them better absorb the fall in the mark-to-market value 
of their equity portfolios. The coefficient on the firm’s (lagged) market beta almost doubles in FY2002. 
Perhaps most significantly, the coefficient on the TOP variable suggests that something changed 
in FY2002. In all years except FY2002, TOP enters the regressions with a negative sign, and is 
generally statistically significant. In FY2001, for example, the estimated coefficient implies that being 
a firm’s main bank tended to reduce the probability of a sale of shares by six percentage points. In 
FY2002, however, the coefficient flips signs (but is statistically insignificant), signalling that banks 
disposed of shares in all types of firms in this year, regardless of whether it was the firm’s main bank. 
On balance, the evidence suggests that firm-bank ties are, in a purely mechanical sense, loosening. 
However, it is not clear from the results above that that the culture of main bank relationships has 
completely disappeared. Banks’ capital adequacy and profitability improved in FY2003-FY2005 as 
equity prices recovered and the credit costs associated with NPL disposal declined significantly, 
reducing their incentive to dispose of shares. Some banks even reported growing requests from firms 
for banks to increase their shareholding (Bank of Japan (2007)). Indeed, after FY2002, the coefficient 
on TOP again turns negative and is statistically significant (Table 2.5).  
6. Bank ties and firm performance 
What are the implications of banks’ share disposal for firm performance? Using data for the 
1980s, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), Morck et al. (2000) and Beason (1999) found that bank affiliation 
was negatively correlated with firm profitability, positively correlated with a firm’s interest payments, 
and uncorrelated with firm volatility.
35 MK2007 showed that the negative relationship between bank 
affiliation and firm profitability remained evident in the data throughout the 1990s, when banks’ 
equity disposal began in earnest.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
regressors are presented in Table 2.5. The number of observations in these regressions is limited to those firms in which 
one of the particular mega-banks held a positive number of shares in the previous period, and thus tends to decline in 
each successive year as banks’ equity portfolios shrank. 
35   Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) measure bank affiliation using a Keiretsu dummy, while Morck et al. (2000) use firm-bank 
lending and shareholding data for 1986.   16
This section builds on this work by examining the how the empirical relationship between bank 
ties and firm performance has changed as banks’ disposal of corporate shares accelerated. The analysis 
relies on the empirical framework described in section 2.2, that is regressions of firm performance 
metrics on measures of firm-bank affiliation and control variables. Year-by-year estimates using 
different sub-samples of firms and banks help to track how the coefficients on the firm-bank 
relationship variables have changed over time, in particular since FY2002. The results suggest that the 
effect of bank shareholding ties has weakened less than might have been expected given the degree to 
which banks’ equity portfolios have shrunk in recent years. 
The dependent variables examined here are firm profitability, interest payments, and measures of 
firms’ stock price volatility. Firm profitability is measured by operating profits normalized by gross 
sales revenue (PROF_SL), although the results are similar if earnings per share (EPS) is used. Interest 
payments are measured as the interest on non-bond debt divided by total non-bond debt. Finally, year-
specific measures of the firm’s stock price beta and total stock price volatility (i.e. the standard 
deviation of raw returns) are taken as measures of firm volatility.
36 
The independent variables paired with these three dependent variables consist of sets of firm- and 
firm-bank-specific controls.
37 The log of gross sales (lnRSL) is used to control for firm size in all 
regressions. Lags of sales growth (RSLGR) and average Q (Ave Q) are thought to be positively 
correlated with operating profits, and negatively correlated with interest payments. Differences in 
firms’ debt structure are controlled for by the inclusion of TDEBT_MC, or total debt over the sum of 
total debt and market capitalization, and by NBDEBT_TL, or total non-bond debt over total liabilities. 
The first of these tracks the overall degree of leverage in the firm, whereas the second captures the 
degree of bank financing. Regressors which capture variation in ownership structure include 
OWN_TOPTEN, the cumulative ownership by the top ten shareholders, and OWN_INDIV, 
OWN_FORGN and OWN_OTHER, the cumulative ownership by individuals, by foreigners and by 
other shareholders, respectively. 
The regressors of interest are those which capture the strength of the firm-bank lending and 
shareholding relationship. The main bank for each firm is chosen using the four-step mechanical 
selection procedure described in section 5. Once each firm’s main bank is identified, the strength of 
the lending tie with this bank is captured by TOP_LNTL, or total loans from the top bank normalized 
by total liabilities. Similarly, TOP_OWN is the percent of outstanding shares held by the top bank. 
Finally, the regressions also include a dummy, KEIRETSU, which is set equal to one if the firm was a 
member of one of the financial Keiretsu groups. 
                                                      
36   Only the results using total stock price volatility are presented here.  
37   Each regression also includes a dummy which equals one if the observation was based on a non-12 month accounting 
period, and a full set of industry and year dummies.   17
The analysis consists of a series of instrumental variable (IV) regressions, where lags of all right-
hand side variables are used as instruments for current period values. The exceptions to this are the 
firm-bank relationship-specific variables (TOP_OWN and TOP_LNTL) and the sales-growth regressor; 
for these variables, only lags are used.
38 The regressions are run on firms which have been in existence 
since at least FY1991, and the full sample is balanced from FY1991 to FY2004 (although regression 
results from the 1980s are presented as well).
39 Firms for which stock price data and data on the year- 
and bank-specific lending relationships are not available are also dropped, leaving a total of 1,228 
firms. Using this sample as the base, firms with extreme values of the dependent variable (less than the 
first percentile value, or greater than the ninety-ninth percentile value) are dropped prior to running 
each regression. 
Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of main bank affiliation for the sample of firms used in the 
regressions. In the early 1980s, the banks which ultimately merged into the four mega-banks served as 
the top bank for close to 80% of the firms in the sample. This share consistently fell since then, and by 
FY2003-FY2004 had reached 65%. The major banks still tended to be both the largest shareholder and 
the largest lender among banks (criteria 1), although this has become somewhat less prevalent since 
FY2000.
40 
6.1 Results for full sample 
The regression results, using firms’ profit rate as the dependent variable, are presented in Table 
3.3 for each of four time periods. The results presented in the first column for each time period 
(labelled “All”) are based on regressions using the entire sample of firms. These regressions have been 
“built up” by including only TOP_OWN, and then adding other control regressors, although only the 
final set of results are presented. In each of the four periods (full sample), larger firms (as captured by 
lnRSL) have lower profit rates, as do those that are more highly leveraged (TDEBT_MC) and those 
that rely more heavily on bank debt (NBDEBT_TL). Foreign ownership is positively associated with 
firms’ profit rate, as is lagged sales growth. 
A striking result across these regressions is that ownership by the main bank is negatively 
associated with firm profitability even in the FY2001-FY2004 period when the unwinding of cross-
shareholding accelerated. Ownership by the main bank (TOP_OWN) enters negatively and 
                                                      
38   Using lags of TOP_OWN and TOP_LNTL generally yield less statistically significant coefficients than current-period 
values, but are arguably more appropriate since correlation between current period values and the error term can bias the 
coefficients. 
39   Balancing between 1991 and 2004, rather than from, say, 1982 to 2004 means that some firms enter the sample during 
the 1980s. This yields a somewhat larger sample of firm for the later period, which is the focus of this study. 
40   Of firms with a “major” main bank, the share of firms for which the bank was both the largest shareholder and the largest 
lender amongst banks (criteria 1 divided by total with major main bank) has fluctuated between 60% and 75% since the 
early 1980s. It has been on a downward trend since 1999, and reached 63% in FY2004.   18
significantly in each of the four time periods, even after controlling for the main bank’s loan share 
(TOP_LNTL) and firms’ Keiretsu affiliation. The size of the coefficient is largest in the most recent 
period (FY2001-FY2004). Taken at face value, the estimates suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in ownership by the top bank is associated with 0.4 percentage point reduction in the firms’ 
profit rate in each of the periods except FY1990-FY1996. 
A similar exercise is repeated in Table 3.4 using interest expenses (INT_NBDEBT) as the 
dependent variable. Across the full-sample regressions (columns marked “All”), TOP_OWN enters 
positively and significantly only twice, in the FY1990-FY1996 and FY2000-FY2001 periods. Thus, 
the evidence that ownership by the top bank is associated with higher interest payments is quite weak. 
However, the coefficients on the TOP_LNTL variable, which tracks the firm’s total outstanding loans 
from the main bank scaled by total liabilities, are far more consistent across time periods. In all 
periods, TOP_LNTL enters positively and significantly, implying that greater concentration of debt 
from the main bank is associated with higher interest payments. 
Finally, Table 3.5 presents results from regressions using the firms’ stock price volatility as the 
dependent variable. As hypothesized by Beason (1999), main bank-affiliated firms may enjoy lower 
volatility, possibly in exchange for reduced profits and higher interest expenses. Yet the results 
indicate, if anything, just the opposite. For the full-sample regressions, the coefficients on TOP_OWN 
and TOP_LNTL are rarely significant. When these regressors do enter significantly, they tend to imply 
that ownership by the top bank is positively associated with volatility. 
On balance, these results for the pooled sample of firms suggest that affiliation with a main bank 
is associated with worse firm performance. The variables tracking main-bank affiliation tend to enter 
with a negative sign in firm profitability regressions, and with a positive sign in regressions with firm 
interest expenses as the dependent variable. However, from these results alone, it is impossible to 
determine whether main bank affiliation is the cause of this poor performance, or whether main banks 
simply tended to hold shares in firms which happened to have lower than average profitability. This 
issue is taken up in the next section. 
6.2 Firm performance and access to outside financing options 
The results presented above suggest that firms with strong main bank ties tend to perform worse, 
and face higher interest payments, than otherwise. The goal of this section is to shed some light on 
whether affiliation with a main bank is the cause of this poor firm performance, because banks extract 
rents from dependent firms, or whether banks happen to hold shares in firms which perform poorly. 
The approach taken here follows Morck et al. (2000). The sample of firms is split according to 
firms’ history of access to the bond market. Such a division is meant to isolate those firms that have 
always had full range of financing options from those which have historically been bank dependent. 
The argument behind this approach is the following. If main banks extracted rents from their client 
firms via higher interest payments, they should have been able to do so from bank dependent firms (i.e.   19
those  without outside financing options) regardless of whether the bank held the firm’s equity. 
However, for firms with outside financing options (bank independent firms), banks had to rely more 
on their shareholding toehold to expropriate rents. As argued by Morck et al. (2000), the empirical 
relationship between bank ownership and firm performance metrics may be different for firms that are 
truly bank dependent since “…a banks’ power to extract surplus is greater when the firm is heavily 
dependent on the bank, as would be the case if the firm were prohibited from issuing public debt. Such 
firms would be subject to bank appropriation regardless of the level of bank ownership.” (p. 555). 
This hypothesis has several empirical implications. Bank dependent firms should, all else equal, 
exhibit worse firm performance, higher interest payments and a higher degree of bank financing than 
bank independent firms. Of course, this by itself would not necessarily imply rent extraction behaviour 
by banks, since bank dependent firms may exhibit worse firm performance precisely because they do 
not have access to outside financing options. However, in a world where banks enjoy market power 
over their client firms, a regression of firm performance metrics on measures of main bank affiliation 
should yield a more robust statistical relationship between firm performance and bank ownership (eg 
the  TOP_OWN variable) for bank independent firms, since banks do not necessarily need the 
shareholding toehold to extract surplus from these firms. 
Admittedly, it is difficult in practice to identify firms that are truly “bank dependent”. Firms that 
can easily issue bonds in the capital markets may choose bank financing. Indeed, as shown by 
Arikawa and Miyajima (2007), firms which had relied on external sources of finance in the 1980s 
increasingly turned back to bank financing throughout the 1990s, particularly firms in the retail trade, 
construction and real estate development industries.
41 Thus, a simple sample split based on, say, firms’ 
share of loan financing in total debt is not necessarily a good indicator of financing constraints.  
The approach taken here is to use the bond issuing criteria in place in the 1980s (Table 3.2) to 
identify those firms which had a consistent history of access to bond financing. In the regression 
results that follow, a firm is termed “Eligible” if it passed the bond issuing criteria at least five times 
between the FY1982-FY1989 period, and “Ineligible” otherwise.
42 These restrictions on bond issues 
were lifted in the early 1990s, after which all firms were supposedly free to issue bonds.
43 Thus, we 
should not necessarily expect to observe the same pattern of regression coefficients across these 
groups for the 1980s and for later periods. 
                                                      
41   Arikawa and Miyajima (2007) report that the share of listed firms “exclusively dependent upon bank borrowing” 
increased from 29.4% in 1991 to 46.9% in 2000. The share of firms “exclusively dependent on bond issuance” plus those 
relying on a “mixture of bond issuance and bank borrowing” fell from 63.6% in 1990 to 41.4% in 2000. 
42   Five was chosen to split the total balanced sample of firms roughly in half. There are 522 Eligible firms and 564 
Ineligible firms. 
43   All criteria (except ratings) were removed from the guidelines restricting bond issues in November 1990. In April 1993, 
the lowest bound of the ratings criteria for issuing unsecured straight bonds was lowered to BBB. See details in Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Sharfstein (1993) and Anderson and Makhija (1999).   20
Some relevant sample statistics for these two groups of firms, Eligible and Ineligible, are 
presented in Graphs 3.1-3.2. Eligible firms were consistently larger and more profitable, with lower 
average interest expenses on non-bond debt and lower stock price volatility (Graph 3.1). They were 
also much more likely to issue bonds, and were less dependent on their main bank (Graph 3.2), 
although both groups of firms moved towards loan financing in the 1990s. By almost any measure, 
eligible firms, on average, continued to outperform the ineligible firms even after the bond issuing 
restrictions were lifted. 
The results of regressions run separately for these groups of firms are presented under the 
headings of “Inelig” and “Elig” in Table 3.3. Overall, the negative association between ownership by 
the main bank and firm profitability tends to be strongest for the more profitable firms with a history 
of outside financing options. That is, the coefficient on the TOP_OWN variable is larger (ie more 
negative) at a greater level of significance for the Eligible group of firms in all but the FY1991-
FY1996 period. A one standard deviation increase in ownership by the top bank is associated with a 
0.5 percentage point reduction in Eligible firms’ profit rate in the FY1997-FY2000 and FY2001-
FY2004 periods, but only a 0.1 percentage point reduction in the FY1991-1996 period. These results 
do not seem to be driven by firms in those industries which increasingly relied on bank financing in 
the 1990s (i.e. real estate development, retail trade and construction), and which are weighted more 
heavily in the Ineligible group of firms. Dropping all firms in these industries and re-estimating does 
not have an effect on the pattern of coefficients observed in Table 3.3. 
These regressions were repeated for individual years using a pooled sample of firms, and after 
interacting dummies for the mega-banks with the TOP_OWN variable, a specification which allows 
for the time variation in the coefficient on this variable to be tracked separately for each of the four 
mega-banks. The results of this exercise (presented in Table A.1 in the appendix) indicate that the 
negative association between ownership by the top bank and profitability is driven (primarily) by firms 
associated with Resona and Mizuho. In contrast, this relationship does not appear as strong for Tokyo 
Mitsubishi UFJ, nor are the differences across the Eligible and Ineligible firm groups as stark. 
Table 3.4 presents the results using interest expenses as the dependent variable. Equity ownership 
by the main bank tends to be associated with increased interest expenses for the Eligible groups of 
firms in the FY1991-FY1996 and FY1997-FY2000 periods. In contrast, there is no association 
between equity ownership and interest expenses for the FY2001-FY2004 period for either group of 
firms. However, affiliation with a main bank does seem to matter; greater loan concentration from the 
main bank, as tracked by the TOP_LNTL variable, enters with a positive sign and is statistically 
significant in each period and for each group of firms. In all but the FY1990-FY1996 period, the 
coefficient on this variable is larger for the Eligible group of firms. For these firms, a one standard 
deviation increase in TOP_LNTL is associated with greater interest rate on non-bond debt of .07% in 
the FY1997-2000 period, and a .1% increase in the 2000-2004 period.   21
Overall, the results presented above tend to be consistent with those found for earlier periods in 
Japan.  Affiliation with a main bank, as proxied by equity ownership and lending variables, tends to be 
negatively associated with firm performance, and positively associated with interest expenses, even 
after banks’ substantial disposal of corporate equities. Moreover, the results are broadly in line with 
the empirical relationships used to support the rent extraction argument examined by Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998) and Morck et al. (2000). The statistical relationship tends to be strongest for the least 
bank dependent group of firms, even as late as the FY2001-FY2004 period. That said, there is much 
yet to explore on this question, since it could also be the case that banks simply have held onto to 
poorly performing firms within the group of best performers (i.e. Eligible firms). Sorting out these 
issues is the focus of ongoing research. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The evidence presented here from the Kaigin database suggests that, mechanically at least, the 
ownership link between firms and their major banks has loosened considerably since FY2001. 
Between FY1997 and FY2000, the lower-bound estimate of the number of corporate shares held by 
the group of banks that ultimately merged into the four mega-banks decreased by more than 20%; by 
FY2004 it had decreased by over 60% (Graph 2.1). While these banks portfolios are still large and 
well diversified, the process of share disposal presumably should have weakened the ability of banks 
to monitor firms (or extract rents, as the case may be), and thus lead to less robust empirical 
relationships between firm performance and bank affiliation than those observed prior to the 
unwinding process. 
A closer look at the data suggests that firm-bank ties may not have loosened as much as this share 
disposal might suggest. Banks’ equity portfolios have become smaller, but they remained remarkably 
similar in structure in FY2003 to those in FY1996, indicating that banks adopted an approach of 
selling shares across all industries, rather than targeted disposal of firms in a particular economic 
sector (Table 2.2). The incidence of share sales picked up noticeably in FY2001 and FY2002 when 
regulatory scrutiny increased pressure on banks to reduce their equity holdings. In these years, banks 
disposed of shares in all types of firms, particularly shares that outperformed the market, or those with 
a high market beta.  
However, the evidence suggests that banks remained reluctant to sell shares in their client firms 
through FY2004. Indeed, even after significant equity disposal, firms’ top banks still tended to be both 
the largest lender and the largest shareholder among banks. Overall, the results from the second half of 
the paper indicate that the statistical regularities in the coefficients on firm-bank affiliation measures in 
the 1980s continue to be evident after significant equity disposal had taken place. Even in the FY2000-
FY2004 period, affiliation with a main bank is negatively associated with firm profits, positively 
associated with interest payments, and largely unassociated with stock price volatility. Thus, while   22
shareholding has been reduced in absolute terms, it is less clear whether the broader relationships 
between banks and firms in Japan have changed as well.   23
Appendix 
Table A.1 presents the results from year-by-year regressions of firms’ profit rate on the full set of 
regressors used in Table 3.3. In these regressions, the TOP_OWN variable is interacted with dummies 
for each of the four mega-banks, allowing for a separate coefficient to be estimated for each year and 
each bank. As shown in the top panel, the negative relationship between the profit rate and ownership 
by the main bank is strongest and the most consistent across years for those firms whose main bank 
was one that ultimately was merged into the Mizuho mega-bank group (see Graphs 2.2 and 2.3), 
although the coefficients for other banks also enter negatively and significantly as well. The centre and 
bottom panels indicate that, with the exception of the Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ banking group, this effect 
was again the most evident for the Eligible group of firms. Again, the results for FY2002 stand out. 
The coefficient on the TOP_OWN variable for this year is generally the largest (i.e. most negative) 
across years, the exception being the coefficient on ownership by Resona which peaks in FY2004.    24
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Table 1.1: Industry composition of mega-banks’ equity portfolios (FY1996–FY2003) 
Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ  Mizuho 
Change in Portfolio 
weights 
Change in Portfolio 
weights 


















Agriculture                 
Ceramic Products  102  -58.4  -0.7  -0.6  92  -57.8  -1.0  -0.7 
Chemical Products  318  -53.1  5.0  3.5  424  -54.9  -1.1  -3.8 
Communication            0  -98.4  0.7  0.4 
Construction  187  -42.7  1.3  1.4  184  -48.8  -1.1  -0.1 
Electric Machinery  200  -66.8  0.3  -0.3  236  -65.6  -4.5  -4.0 
Electricity, Gas, Water    32  -83.8  -0.8  -0.8  205  -38.0  3.6  3.0 
Foods Manufacturing  143  -39.2  1.3  1.8  251  -32.5  1.6  2.0 
General Machinery  184  -67.0  -0.2  1.1  144  -76.9  -0.1  -0.2 
Iron/Steel Products  141  -63.6  -0.4  0.3  314  -64.3  -1.5  0.1 
Wood Products     0  -89.4  0.0  0.0    6  70.9  0.0  0.0 
Metal Products   32  -46.1  -0.1  0.2  31  -38.7  -0.2  0.0 
Mining     1  13.9  0.0  0.0    8  28.8  0.2  0.2 
Misc Manufacturing  50  -63.6  -0.4  -0.6  59  -40.6  -0.3  -0.3 
Non-Ferrous Metals  64  -48.9  0.0  0.3  62  -66.0  -0.7  -0.4 
Petroleum Products  29  -60.2  -0.4  -0.1  52  -53.1  -1.1  -0.3 
Precision Instruments  40  -64.0  1.6  1.1  36  -49.5  0.3  0.0 
Printed Products  26  -56.8  0.0  0.1  48  -46.5  -0.2  0.0 
Pulp/Paper Products  23  -43.3  0.1  0.2  55  -64.4  0.9  0.4 
Real Estate Dev  60  -46.0  1.3  1.1  14  -66.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Retail Trade  119  -53.3  -0.5  1.1  82  -57.9  -1.0  -0.4 
Rubber Products  19  -38.3  0.1  0.2  47  -39.4  -0.4  0.0 
Services  52  -49.3  0.2  0.7  87  -22.3  0.1  1.2 
Textile Products  127  -42.0  0.3  0.7  105  -46.7  -0.2  -0.1 
Transport Equipment  269  -74.2  -9.4  -15.3  119  -80.2  -5.0  -7.6 
Transport Service  243  -56.4  2.7  4.1  489  -21.0  10.9  10.0 
Wholesale Trade  291  -65.8  -0.9  0.2  365  -39.6  0.3  0.3 
Average  110  -54.33  0.02  0.02  135  -44.98  0.00  -0.02 
Standard Dev  96  19.38  2.34  3.39  135  33.46  2.76  2.86 
 
1 Shares held in FY2003; In millions of shares. 
2  Percent change in the number of shares held, 1996-2003.  
3  Change in the portfolio weight of shares in held in 
each industry. Calculated using current period equity prices, and thus includes valuation changes. In percentage points.  
4  Change in the portfolio weight of 
shares in held in each industry. Calculated using constant end-2003 equity prices. In percentage points.   27
 
Table 1.1 (cont): Industry composition of mega-banks’ equity portfolios (FY1996–FY2003) 
Sumitomo Mitsui  Resona 
Change in Portfolio 
weights 
Change in Portfolio 
weights 


















Agriculture                 
Ceramic Products  60  -45.4  0.2  0.2   3  -93.0  -2.0  -3.3 
Chemical Products  240  -61.6  -1.1  -3.2  44  -78.8  -1.8  -4.8 
Communication                 
Construction  170  -55.2  -1.3  0.0  83  -69.9  -0.7  1.2 
Electric Machinery  247  -64.2  -4.7  -2.6  120  -67.9  0.1  -1.2 
Electricity, Gas, Water  111  -46.8  3.6  3.5  26  -85.2  3.1  3.2 
Foods Manufacturing  68  -48.1  0.2  0.4  21  -74.3  -0.6  -0.8 
General Machinery  160  -64.0  -2.2  -2.1  80  -72.3  5.1  5.6 
Iron/Steel Products  148  -59.5  -0.9  0.2  32  -84.3  -2.0  -0.2 
Wood Products    5  -57.4  0.0  0.0         
Metal Products  34  -46.5  0.3  0.6  11  -68.4  -0.5  0.0 
Mining  29  87.2  0.4  0.4         
Misc Manufacturing  40  -51.0  -0.1  0.4  27  -58.5  -1.8  -2.0 
Non-Ferrous Metals  58  -60.4  -0.5  0.1  17  -71.2  0.1  0.4 
Petroleum Products           3  -67.5  -0.1  0.0 
Precision Instruments  27  -64.5  0.6  -0.1  18  -73.1  7.3  6.1 
Printed Products  22  -61.7  -0.4  -0.2   0  51.0  0.0  0.1 
Pulp/Paper Products  43  -60.8  0.9  0.5   4  -77.9  -0.3  -0.3 
Real Estate Dev  58  -39.0  1.5  1.4  10  -22.6  0.4  0.5 
Retail Trade  53  -70.5  -3.3  -1.9  18  -82.9  -4.2  -2.6 
Rubber Products  35  -28.5  0.4  1.1   0  -67.0  0.0  0.0 
Services  52  -28.8  1.6  1.5   9  -60.0  0.0  0.3 
Textile Products  69  -51.9  -0.2  0.2   7  -87.8  -0.5  -0.2 
Transport Equipment  171  -65.6  1.7  -4.2  48  -81.0  -1.7  -4.7 
Transport Service  129  -63.6  4.1  3.4  52  -35.6  1.1  1.7 
Wholesale Trade  224  -57.9  0.5  1.1  37  -80.3  -0.9  0.9 
Average  94  -48.57  0.05  0.03  29  -65.59  0.00  0.00 
Standard Dev  74  30.96  1.88  1.80  31  29.94  2.41  2.64 
 
1 Shares held in FY2003; In millions of shares. 
2  Percent change in the number of shares held, 1996-2003.  
3  Change in the portfolio weight of shares in held in 
each industry. Calculated using current period equity prices, and thus includes valuation changes. In percentage points.  
4  Change in the portfolio weight of shares 
in held in each industry. Calculated using constant end-2003 equity prices. In percentage points. 
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Number of bank lending 
relationships
2 
Number of bank 
shareholders
2 
Bank lenders with 
shareholding
3 
1982  1,138  10.3  2.75  88.2% 
1983  1,615  9.63  2.82  88.9% 
1984  1,631  9.41  2.93  88.9% 
1985  1,637  9.26  3.06  89.8% 
1986  1,640  8.92  3.21  91.0% 
1987  1,711  8.75  3.32  89.9% 
1988  1,821  8.53  3.43  91.6% 
1989  1,889  8.37  3.57  90.6% 
1990  1,949  8.32  3.65  91.1% 
1991  1,999  8.35  3.69  90.8% 
1992  2,022  8.44  3.69  91.8% 
1993  2,042  8.45  3.66  91.1% 
1994  2,116  8.41  3.62  91.1% 
1995  2,179  8.15  3.53  90.8% 
1996  2,241  7.92  3.57  90.6% 
1997  2,392  7.77  3.07  84.2% 
1998  2,405  7.60  2.84  82.7% 
1999  2,382  6.41  2.69  83.7% 
2000  2,407  6.17  2.57  79.6% 
2001  2,422  5.92  2.48  77.1% 
2002  2,379  5.80  2.59  75.8% 
2003  2,295  5.82  2.18  69.1% 
2004  2,201  5.77  2.02  64.6% 
 
1  Total number of firms in the Kaigin database.   
2  A firm is considered to have a lending relationship with a bank if the stock of outstanding 
loans from the bank is positive, and a shareholding relationship if the bank is listed as one of the firm’s top ten shareholders. The figures in 
this table are calculated after consolidating total loans and shareholding across the groups of banks according which ultimately merged into 
one of the four mega-banks. This understates the actual number of lending (shareholding) relationships in years prior to bank mergers, but 
captures changes in the number of these relationships independent of the bank merger process.   
3  Percentage of bank lenders that are also 
listed amongst the firm’s top ten shareholders. 
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Table 2.2: Identifying main banks 
Number of firms, by selection criteria 





















































































































































































































































1  The number of firms for which the bank is the largest lender amongst banks and the largest shareholder amongst banks.   
2  The number of firms 
for which the bank is the largest lender amongst banks and is one of the top five shareholders (but not the largest bank shareholder).   
3  The 
number of firms for which the bank is the largest shareholder amongst banks and is one of the top five bank lenders (but not the largest bank 
lender).   
4  The number of firms for which the bank is the largest bank lender, but not amongst the top five bank shareholders. 
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Table 2.3: Incidence of share sales by mega-banks 
Tokyo Mitsubishi 
UFJ 
Sumitomo Mitsui  Mizuho  Resona  Financial 
year 
Total  Sale  Total  Sale  Total  Sale  Total  Sale 
1991  332  0.3%  282  1.8%  416  2.4%  96  3.1% 
1992  335  2.4%  288  0.7%  435  1.8%  98  2.0% 
1993  345  3.2%  297  1.7%  440  3.2%  100  1.0% 
1994  351  2.3%  303  1.0%  450  2.4%  103  3.9% 
1995  366  7.1%  304  2.0%  463  1.5%  103  2.9% 
1996  401  2.5%  325  4.0%  491  5.7%  121  3.3% 
1997  411  12.2%  331  11.8%  502  9.2%  133  12.0% 
1998  383  9.7%  319  11.6%  474  7.6%  124  13.7% 
1999  395  11.9%  321  10.0%  487  11.5%  126  9.5% 
2000  324  15.1%  250  26.0%  393  27.2%  116  13.8% 
2001  337  28.8%  258  26.0%  367  22.3%  110  27.3% 
2002  339  44.0%  267  43.1%  346  38.2%  107  33.6% 
2003  302  40.4%  244  48.0%  373  34.9%  113  46.9% 
2004  264  20.8%  174  32.8%  317  28.1%  86  45.3% 
 
Note: The “total” columns indicate the number of firms for which the mega-bank group has been identified as a top bank (using the 
methodology outlined in Table 2.2) and in which the bank held shares in the previous period. The “Sale” columns indicate the share of these 
firms in which the bank reduced is holdings of shares. Figures are based on the selling dummy variable, SDUM, which is set to one if a bank 
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Table 2.4: The decision of mega-banks to sell shares 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
CON  -0.5315 -0.4212 3.2645  0.6158  0.6299 
  -10.79 -7.6 16.03 7.62  7.77 
NOSHINC  0.0555 0.0248 0.028 0.0284 0.0279 
  5.29 2.29 2.58 2.62 2.57 
NOSHDEC  0.1551 0.1533 0.1788 0.1805 0.1788 
  13.85 13.46 15.42 15.58 15.42 
FIVE  0.1497 0.1564 0.1715 0.1723 0.1716 
  13.57 13.95 15.12 15.17 15.10 
TOP  -0.0516 -0.0559 -0.0592 -0.0618 -0.0587 
  -7.16 -7.61 -8.06 -8.00 -7.52 
Lag TLNSHARE  -0.0656 -0.029 -0.0521    -0.0521 
  -3.63 -1.49 -2.65    -2.64 
Lag TLNTL      -0.0019  -0.0017 
      -0.19  -0.18 
Lag TA  0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
  7.60 5.12 5.54 5.67 5.54 
Lag Ave Q  0.0084 0.0019 0.0029 0.0034 0.0029 
  4.08 0.86 1.30 1.56 1.31 
Lag lnCOVRAT  -0.0018 -0.0001 0.0034 -0.0041 0.0034 
  -0.18 -0.01 0.33 -0.41 0.33 
EXRET   0.0771  0.0576  0.0573  0.0576 
   9.96  8.27  8.16  8.27 
Lag EXRET   0.0811  0.0759  0.076  0.0759 
   6.15  5.77  5.8  5.77 
Lag BETA   0.0929  0.1034  0.1001  0.1033 
   8.86  9.81  9.53  9.79 
Lag IRISK   -0.0141  -0.0113  -0.0123  -0.0113 
   -10.15  -8.28  -9.33  -8.26 
Lag BTA     -0.088  -0.0873  -0.0879 
     -19.51  -19.42  -19.50 
BNETINCTA     -2.3486  -2.3246  -2.3502 
     -5.79  -5.73  -5.79 
Lag BNETINCTA     -0.4399  -0.4135  -0.4421 
     -0.98  -0.92  -0.99 
Pseudo R squared  0.032 0.054 0.071 0.071 0.071 
Number of obs  19,464 19,081 19,081 19,081 19,081 
Note: The table contains the results of probit regressions of the dummy variable SDUM on a set of firm-, bank- and firm-bank specific variables. 
SDUM is set to one if the bank decreased its shareholding in a particular firm between t-1 and t, and zero otherwise. The right-hand-side firm-
specific variables include current (period t) and lagged (period t-1) values of the annual return on the firm’s stock in excess of return on the NKY 
225 index (EXRET and Lag EXRET), the firm’s market beta (Lag BETA) and idiosyncratic risk (Lag IRISK) in period t-1, an estimate of the 
firm’s average Q in t-1 (Lag Ave Q), the share of total bank loans in total liabilities in t-1 (Lag TLNTL), a lag of total assets (Lag TA), the log of 
the interest coverage ratio (Lag lnCOVRAT) and the dummy variables NOSHDEC and NOSHINC, which are set to one if the firm’s number of 
outstanding shares decreased or increased, respectively, in period t. Bank specific variables are the bank’s total assets at t-1 (Lag BTA) and current 
and lagged values of the bank’s return on assets (BNETINCTA). Firm-bank specific variables include the share of the firm's total loans extended 
by the shareholding bank at t-1 (Lag TLNSHARE), a dummy set to one if the bank is identified as the firm's main bank in t-1 (TOP), and a dummy 
set to one if the bank’s shareholding rate in the previous year was greater than 5% (FIVE). Regressions also include a full set of firm-level 
industry dummies, and a dummy for each mega-bank. Robust z statistics are reported under each coefficient.   32
 
Table 2.5  The decision of mega-banks to sell shares, Model 5 by fiscal year
  
  FY 1998  FY1999  FY2000  FY2001  FY 2002  FY2003  FY2004 
TOP  -0.0478 -0.0749 -0.0179 -0.0582 0.0232 -0.0642 -0.0542 
  -3.12 -3.66 -0.81 -2.91 0.87 -2.67 -1.98 
Lag TLNSHARE  -0.0517 -0.0858 -0.1939 0.0117 -0.1007 -0.0192 -0.0501 
  -1.19 -1.33 -3.56 1.53 -1.79 -0.89 -0.95 
Lag TLNTL  -0.0046 -0.0053  0.009  -0.0672 -0.2683 -0.1959 -0.0665 
 -0.13  -0.13  0.19  -1.24  -4.5  -3.09  -1.03 
EXRET 0.0134 0.0124 0.0453 0.1029 0.0793 0.0422 0.0065 
  0.8 1.42  1.77 2.8 2.32  2.90  0.29 
Lag EXRET  -0.026 0.0533 0.0146 0.0804 0.0499 -0.0046 0.029 
  -0.79 2.36 1.15 2.98 1.23 -0.12 1.94 
Lag BETA  0.0211 0.0389 0.1432 0.1627 0.2928 0.2388 0.0979 
  1.43 1.95 5.04 4.60 6.98 6.39 2.55 
Lag IRISK  -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0052 0.0039 -0.0071 -0.0035 -0.0049 
  -0.87 -1.43 -1.56 1.14 -1.76 -0.87 -0.93 
Pseudo R squared  0.102  0.13  0.123  0.095  0.087  0.076  0.065 
Number  of  obs  3,067 2,988 3,012 2,807 2,632 2,445 2,099 
Note: The table contains the results of probit regressions of the dummy variable SDUM on a set of firm-, bank- and firm-bank specific variables. SDUM is set to one if the bank decreased its shareholding in a particular firm between t-1 
and t, and zero otherwise. The right-hand-side firm-specific variables include current (period t) and lagged (period t-1) values of the annual return on the firm’s stock in excess of return on the NKY 225 index (EXRET and Lag EXRET), 
the firm’s market beta (Lag BETA) and idiosyncratic risk (Lag IRISK) in period t-1, an estimate of the firm’s average Q in t-1 (Lag Ave Q), the share of total bank loans in total liabilities in t-1 (Lag TLNTL), a lag of total assets (Lag TA), 
the log of the interest coverage ratio (Lag lnCOVRAT) and the dummy variables NOSHDEC and NOSHINC, which are set to one if the firm’s number of outstanding shares decreased or increased, respectively, in period t. Bank specific 
variables are the bank’s total assets at t-1 (Lag BTA) and current and lagged values of the bank’s return on assets (BNETINCTA). Firm-bank specific variables include the share of the firm's total loans extended by the shareholding bank 
at t-1 (Lag TLNSHARE), a dummy set to one if the bank is identified as the firm's main bank in t-1 (TOP), and a dummy set to one if the bank’s shareholding rate in the previous year was greater than 5% (FIVE). Regressions also include 
a full set of firm-level industry dummies, and a dummy for each mega-bank. Robust z statistics are reported under each coefficient.   33
Table 3.1: Identifying Main Banks   (Regression sample of firms) 
























1982  490  113  46  29  678  61  325  1,064 
1983  653  126  56  35  870  83  129  1,082 
1984  656  117  51  45  869  82  147  1,098 
1985  645  134  47  41  867  74  172  1,113 
1986  612  176  34  40  862  70  167  1,099 
1987  609  196  36  45  886  78  204  1,168 
1988  606  219  33  47  905  84  220  1,209 
1989  560  251  42  43  896  94  233  1,223 
1990  589  241  31  41  902  99  220  1,221 
1991  599  239  34  41  913  90  221  1,224 
1992  595  261  34  35  925  96  207  1,228 
1993  612  245  27  43  927  90  208  1,225 
1994  617  239  28  40  924  89  215  1,228 
1995  653  214  25  34  926  85  214  1,225 
1996  655  216  18  36  925  89  214  1,228 
1997  619  161  39  103  922  86  219  1,227 
1998  637  143  42  108  930  87  210  1,227 
1999  616  98  50  85  849  85  294  1,228 
2000  585  100  75  93  853  88  287  1,228 
2001  572  128  65  95  860  82  286  1,228 
2002  568  95  72  110  845  90  293  1,228 
2003  517  69  75  146  807  97  324  1,228 
2004  494  58  63  175  790  103  335  1,228 
1  The four mega-banks are the groups of banks that ultimately merged into the Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui, Mizuho and Resona 
banking groups. Main banks are identified using loan and shareholding data which is unconsolidated, that is based on the individual banks 
which existed in each year. The figures for trust and regional banks are included in other main banks.   
2  The number of firms for which the 
bank is the largest lender amongst banks and the largest shareholder amongst banks.   
3  The number of firms for which the bank is the largest 
lender amongst banks and is one of the top five shareholders (but not the largest bank shareholder).   
4  The number of firms for which the 
bank is the largest shareholder amongst banks and is one of the top five bank lenders (but not the largest bank lender).   
5  The number of firms 
for which the bank is the largest bank lender, but not amongst the top five bank shareholders.   34
Table 3.2: Example bond issuing criteria 
October 1976 – July 1987 Criteria for domestic secured convertible bonds 
Performance standards  Issuer’s book equity 
  3-6 billion Yen  6-10 billion Yen  > 10 billion Yen 
Book equity/ paid in capital  NA  1.5  1.2 
Book equity/ Total assets  NA  0.2  0.15 
Operational profit/ Total assets  NA   0.05  0.04 
Earnings per share (yen)  NA  7.0  7.0 





EPS, DPS and at least 
two of other three 
criteria 
EPS, DPS and at least 
two of other three 
criteria 
 
July 1987 – May 1989  Criteria for domestic secured convertible bonds 
Performance standards  Issuer’s book equity 
  3-6 billion Yen 6-10 billion Yen  > 10 billion Yen 
Book equity/ paid in capital  2.0  1.5  1.2 
Book equity/ Total assets   0.15   0.12  0.1 
Operational profit/ Total assets   0.07   0.06   0.05 
Earnings per share (yen)  7.0  7.0  7.0 
Dividends per share (yen)  5.0  5.0  5.0 
Approval criteria 
 
EPS, DPS and at least 
two of other three 
criteria 
EPS, DPS and at least 
two of other three 
criteria 
EPS, DPS and at least 







If firm has no bonds outstanding, then DPS and at least 3 of other 4 criteria 
satisfied 
If firm has outstanding bonds: (a) if DPS met in last 3 years then only 1 
remaining criteria satisfied; (b) if DPS met in previous year, then 2 of 
remaining 4 criteria satisfied 
 
Note: Table presents minimum approval criteria for domestic issuance of secured convertible bonds and secured strait bonds for selected 
years. Criteria are taken from Kaneko and Battaglini (1990) and Karp and Koike (1990). A firm wishing to issue bonds in period t must 
have met the below criteria in period t – 1.  
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Table 3.3: Firm profitability and main bank affiliation 
  1982 - 1990  1991 - 1996  1997 - 2000  2001 - 2004 
  All  Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig 
lnRSL  -0.0045  -0.0035 -0.0089 -0.0043 -0.0013 -0.0077 -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0116 -0.0054 -0.0017 -0.0103 
  -9.99  -4.38 -16.08 -8.94 -1.79 -12.14 -7.10 -1.33 -9.24 -6.85 -1.45 -9.64 
TDEBT_MC  -0.04  0.003 -0.0771 -0.053 -0.0514 -0.072 -0.051 -0.0567 -0.0595 -0.0232 -0.0342 -0.0332 
  -7.41  0.37 -10.22 -10.3 -7.30 -8.61 -10.65 -9.04 -7.03 -4.58 -4.90 -3.79 
NBDEBT_TL  -0.0233  -0.0226 -0.0138 -0.0216 -0.0334 -0.0207 -0.032 -0.0647 -0.0208 -0.0185 -0.0969 0.0003 
  -4.60  -2.14 -2.24 -5.02 -5.43 -3.21 -5.87 -6.42 -2.89 -2.18 -5.14 0.03 
OWN_TOPTEN  -0.0081  -0.0279 0.0167 0.0119 0.009 0.0222 0.0053 -0.004 0.0283 -0.0094 -0.0164 -0.001 
  -1.20  -2.69 2.02 1.72 0.95 2.28 0.53 -0.30 1.76 -0.90 -1.19 -0.07 
OWN_INDIV  -0.0042  0.0213 -0.0173 -0.0003 0.0134 -0.0086 -0.0291 -0.0035 -0.0628 -0.0406 -0.0178 -0.0896 
  -0.71  2.27 -2.50 -0.04 1.47 -0.93 -2.32 -0.29 -2.61 -4.32 -1.40 -7.06 
OWN_FORGN  0.1608  0.0888 0.1514 0.1273 0.0937 0.1509 0.1148 0.087 0.1313 0.0743 0.0641 0.0631 
  12.19  4.58 10.84 10.42 5.00 10.54 6.43 3.37 5.08 5.30 2.55 3.66 
OWN_OTHER  -0.0288  -0.0003 -0.0355 -0.0262 -0.0171 -0.0274 -0.033 -0.0168 -0.0467 -0.0363 -0.0245 -0.0543 
  -5.54  -0.04 -5.32 -4.81 -2.24 -3.69 -3.90 -1.53 -3.81 -4.33 -2.22 -4.67 
RSL_GR  0.0396  0.0378 0.0528 0.0687 0.0571 0.0867 0.0593 0.0424 0.0823 0.0062 0.0109 0.0023 
  4.74  3.66 7.86 11.49 7.87 8.46 8.15 5.30 6.11 1.45 1.41 0.65 
KEIRETSU  -0.0036  -0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0041 -0.0059 -0.0055 -0.0044 -0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0011 -0.0064 
  -4.22  -1.48 -5.19 -5.77 -3.04 -4.73 -4.55 -2.58 -3.64 -2.94 -0.61 -3.75 
TOP_LNTL  0.0125  0.0027 0.0424 -0.009 -0.0135 0.0297 0.025 0.0132 0.0646 0.0089 0.022 0.0161 
  1.35  0.25 2.48 -0.76 -0.93 1.46 2.32 0.95 3.63 0.91 1.66 1.07 
TOP_OWN  -0.1342  -0.0515 -0.1214 -0.0587 -0.0505 -0.0502 -0.1451 -0.0926 -0.1741 -0.1553 -0.0954 -0.2253 
  -6.24  -1.66 -4.08 -2.12 -1.15 -1.41 -4.67 -2.11 -4.12 -5.12 -2.04 -4.71 
R
2  0.303  0.329 0.384 0.273 0.281 0.333 0.289 0.300 0.361 0.236 0.267 0.324 
Number of obs  7,842  3,831 4,011 6,506 3,380 3,126 4,342 2,256 2,086 4,344 2,256 2,088 
Note: The table contains the results of IV regressions of operating profits normalized by gross sales on a set of firm and firm-bank relationship specific variables. lnRSL is the log of gross sales, TDEBT_MC is total debt over the 
sum of total debt and market capitalization, NBDEBT_TL is non-bond debt over total liabilities, and OWN_INDIV, OWN_FOREIGN and OWN_OTHER are cumulative ownership by individuals, by foreigners, and by other non-
financial businesses in Japan respectively. RSL_GR is a lag or real sales growth, KEIRETSU is a dummy for firm membership in one of the financial Keiretsu, TOP_LNTL is the total loans extended by the top bank scaled by 
total liabilities, TOP_OWN is ownership by the top bank. Each regression includes a full set of industry dummies. The current value of each variable is instrumented with a one period lag, The exceptions to this are RSL_GR, 
TOP_LNTL and TOP_OWN, where only one-period lagged values of this variables are used. Robust t statistics are reported under each coefficient. Eligible firms are those that passed the bond issuing criteria at least 5 times 
between 1982 and 1989, and Ineligible firms are those that did not.   36
Table 3.4: Firm interest expenses and main bank affiliation 
  1982-1990  1991-1996  1997-2000  2001-2004 
All  Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig 
lnRSL  -0.0011  -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0003 
  -7.98  -8.01 -2.58 -6.84 -7.53 -2.19 -1.16 -2.02 -1.67 -5.04 -5.67 -2.7 
PROF_SL  -0.0098  -0.0099 -0.0129 -0.0063 -0.0085 -0.0079 0.0055 0.0083 -0.0012 0.0013 0.0031 0.00 
  -2.98  -1.73 -2.92 -2.35 -1.81 -2.39 3.82 2.85 -0.81 0.80 1.19 0.02 
TDEBT_MC  0.0755  0.0712 0.0716 0.0546 0.053 0.0553 0.0261 0.0264 0.0243 0.0263 0.0284 0.0243 
  51.98  33.91 25.6 44.54 31.35 25.41 39.29 26.95 25.61 32.91 27.41 15.42 
NBDEBT_TL  0.0161  0.0147 0.012 0.0203 0.0185 0.0204 0.0103 0.0108 0.0095 0.0086 0.0099 0.0077 
  10.38  3.47 6.27 21.63 12.09 15.57 17.42 10.08 12.94 11.15 7.22 6.83 
OWN_TOPTEN  0.0033  0.0006 0.0041 -0.0004 -0.0036 0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0036 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0022 
  1.77  0.21 1.73 -0.30 -1.85 1.25 -2.03 -3.21 -0.73 -1.66 -0.84 -1.55 
OWN_INDIV  -0.0077  -0.0147 -0.0055 -0.0046 -0.009 -0.0027 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0008 0.0001 0.0014 
  -4.88  -6.50 -2.56 -3.77 -5.17 -1.50 0.28 0.66 -2.96 1.21 0.10 1.27 
OWN_FORGN  -0.0056  -0.0048 -0.0069 -0.0022 -0.0104 0.0009 0.0027 0.0047 0.0007 0.0041 0.0055 0.0041 
  -1.95  -0.89 -1.98 -0.92 -2.62 0.28 2.11 2.31 0.40 4.46 3.31 3.27 
OWN_OTHER  -0.01  -0.0138 -0.0085 -0.0055 -0.0091 -0.0037 -0.0008 0.00 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0018 0.001 
  -7.43  -7.40 -4.44 -4.56 -5.57 -2.05 -1.09 -0.03 -1.27 -1.01 -1.91 0.94 
RSL_GR  0.00  0.00 0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  -7.25  -3.73 0.68 -1.60 -1.91 -0.29 0.31 -0.33 1.38 -2.03 -0.83 -1.78 
KEIRETSU  0.0003  0.0002 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  1.17  0.61 1.01 -0.75 1.25 -2.20 -0.50 -0.55 -1.32 -1.82 -0.85 -1.75 
TOP_LNTL  0.0319  0.023 0.0598 0.0208 0.0244 0.0195 0.0065 0.0057 0.0088 0.0105 0.0073 0.0134 
  9.83  6.21 10.06 7.48 7.40 3.76 4.21 2.68 3.62 4.22 2.01 3.72 
TOP_OWN  -0.0062  -0.031 -0.0011 0.0239 -0.0063 0.0396 0.0112 0.0067 0.0133 -0.0086 -0.0036 -0.0092 
  -0.96  -3.57 -0.11 3.92 -0.69 4.83 3.32 1.20 3.13 -1.79 -0.45 -1.53 
R
2  0.586  0.591 0.55 0.63 0.671 0.573 0.596 0.616 0.572 0.605 0.625 0.559 
Number of obs  7,847  3,642 4,205 6,529 3,242 3,287 4,358 2,164 2,194 4,360 2,164 2,196 
Note: The table contains the results of IV regressions of interest expenses on non-bond debt over total non-bond debt on a set of firm and firm-bank relationship specific variables. lnRSL is the log of gross sales, TDEBT_MC is 
total debt over the sum of total debt and market capitalization, NBDEBT_TL is non-bond debt over total liabilities, and OWN_INDIV, OWN_FOREIGN and OWN_OTHER are cumulative ownership by individuals, by foreigners, 
and by other non-financial businesses in Japan respectively. RSL_GR is a lag or real sales growth, KEIRETSU is a dummy for firm membership in one of the financial Keiretsu, TOP_LNTL is the total loans extended by the top 
bank scaled by total liabilities, TOP_OWN is ownership by the top bank. Each regression includes a full set of industry dummies. The current value of each variable is instrumented with a one period lag, The exceptions to this 
are RSL_GR, TOP_LNTL and TOP_OWN, where only one-period lagged values of this variables are used. Robust t statistics are reported under each coefficient. Eligible firms are those that passed the bond issuing criteria at 
least 5 times between 1982 and 1989, and Ineligible firms are those that did not.   37
Table 3.5: Firm stock price volatility and affiliation with the top bank 
  1982-1990  1991-1996  1997-2000  2001-2004 
All  Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig  All Inelig Elig All Inelig Elig 
lnRSL  -0.7041  -0.4255 -0.5933 -0.4874 -0.5372 -0.3725  -0.8858 -1.1642 -0.3011 -0.6997 -0.9766 -0.1482 
  -10.62  -1.70 -10.34 -14.92 -11.12 -16.87  -17.56 -15.84 -5.84 -13.9 -12.21 -2.89 
PROF_SL  -5.9671  -5.8485 -5.7071 -9.5904 -8.3982 -8.5057  -21.6736 -26.3936 -11.4079 -17.4729 -24.3564 -5.6713 
  -2.37  -1.05 -4.04 -5.40 -2.29 -10.66  -12.11 -8.41 -7.14 -13.7 -12.08 -4.01 
TDEBT_MC  6.8747  8.7712 2.1107 2.7494 3.0888 2.2309  7.1479 8.7382 4.3745 10.1457 11.5415 6.9185 
  3.04  2.64 1.99 7.38 6.51 5.79  14.07 12.25 8.16 16.71 13.34 11.64 
NBDEBT_TL  2.3799  3.2515 1.62 1.5902 1.4059 1.4855  4.9741 6.4413 3.5203 3.4003 3.4822 2.1968 
  4.40  2.11 4.23 5.91 2.42 6.96  12.71 7.76 8.96 7.30 3.06 4.24 
OWN_TOPTEN  3.9855  10.0949 0.2784 1.8433 2.3266 0.1439  1.5379 2.034 0.1701 2.318 3.0386 0.8721 
  1.96  1.88 0.51 2.23 1.92 0.42  2.37 2.20 0.25 3.53 3.08 1.32 
OWN_INDIV  2.6414  8.1282 -0.5289 2.9196 4.3042 -0.1974  0.6184 0.71 -0.0988 1.7538 2.0597 1.6473 
  1.60  1.88 -0.95 1.75 1.63 -0.71  0.96 0.85 -0.16 3.34 2.42 2.85 
OWN_FORGN  1.4544  -8.9939 2.5728 1.7555 2.6059 -0.447  7.7012 6.0831 5.0336 7.0069 8.2456 3.7916 
  1.17  -1.62 1.93 1.60 1.31 -0.90  8.57 4.17 6.12 8.68 5.27 5.70 
OWN_OTHER  -0.4052  -1.4692 0.3721 0.9562 1.6772 -0.0651  1.1451 0.6494 0.7688 0.425 0.1618 0.1644 
  -0.50  -0.87 0.53 1.94 1.84 -0.24  2.11 0.78 1.45 0.78 0.18 0.33 
KEIRETSU  -0.3976  -0.8437 -0.1116 -0.1135 -0.2614 -0.0003  -0.0293 -0.2722 0.1211 0.0115 -0.0858 0.0285 
  -3.28  -3.41 -0.92 -2.25 -2.58 -0.01  -0.37 -2.13 1.58 0.15 -0.66 0.37 
RSL_GR  0.3604  0.4641 -0.0091 -1.4352 -2.4964 -0.3676  -0.8735 -1.4402 -0.4691 -0.1309 0.0184 -0.2762 
  0.74  0.68 -0.02 -1.09 -1.12 -1.26  -2.03 -2.35 -1.03 -1.35 0.12 -2.42 
TOP_LNTL  -1.8058  -1.2293 -1.3164 -0.6566 -1.2576 -0.1442  -1.7816 -3.2023 0.937 1.6507 -0.2671 5.32 
  -0.61  -0.3 -0.64 -0.55 -0.74 -0.22  -1.93 -2.58 0.86 1.31 -0.21 2.06 
TOP_OWN  0.6456  -4.5901 9.4463 13.511 19.5708 3.8284  4.7414 4.366 6.3735 -1.5684 -1.7606 0.8521 
  0.11  -0.48 1.65 1.75 1.62 2.09  1.81 1.16 2.07 -0.64 -0.45 0.33 
R
2  0.041  0.041 0.178 0.116 0.081 0.436  0.407 0.43 0.294 0.406 0.401 0.389 
Number of obs  6,857  3,148 3,709 6,506 3,380 3,126  4,342 2,256 2,086 4,344 2,256 2,088 
Note: The table contains the results of IV regressions of the annual standard deviation of a firms’ stock price (calculated with daily data) on a set of firm and firm-bank relationship specific variables. lnRSL is the log of gross sales, 
TDEBT_MC is total debt over the sum of total debt and market capitalization, NBDEBT_TL is non-bond debt over total liabilities, and OWN_INDIV, OWN_FOREIGN and OWN_OTHER are cumulative ownership by individuals, 
by foreigners, and by other non-financial businesses in Japan respectively. RSL_GR is a lag or real sales growth, KEIRETSU is a dummy for firm membership in one of the financial Keiretsu, TOP_LNTL is the total loans extended 
by the top bank scaled by total liabilities, TOP_OWN is ownership by the top bank. Each regression includes a full set of industry dummies. The current value of each variable is instrumented with a one period lag, The exceptions 
to this are RSL_GR, TOP_LNTL and TOP_OWN, where only one-period lagged values of this variables are used. Robust t statistics are reported under each coefficient. Eligible firms are those that passed the bond issuing criteria at 
least 5 times between 1982 and 1989, and Ineligible firms are those that did not  
 
Table A.1: Profitability regressions:  














1996  -0.1659  -2.45  -0.2006  -2.97  -0.1373  -1.9  -0.1819  -1.65  1086  0.283 
1997  -0.1365  -2.05  -0.1679  -2.59  -0.0958  -1.39  -0.2509  -2.27  1085  0.312 
1998  -0.1774  -2.58  -0.1  -1.37  -0.2045  -2.38  -0.1596  -1.37  1085  0.319 
1999  -0.1879  -2.93  -0.0929  -1.33  -0.0723  -0.92  -0.2135  -1.83  1086  0.298 
2000  -0.192  -2.33  -0.0055  -0.07  0.0186  0.2  -0.1789  -1.41  1086  0.27 
2001  -0.1687  -2.09  -0.1052  -1.33  -0.1099  -1.19  -0.1492  -1.2  1086  0.232 
2002  -0.2151  -2.97  -0.2809  -3.91  -0.1943  -2.59  -0.164  -1.45  1086  0.241 











2004  -0.1356  -1.8  -0.1795  -2.08  -0.1487  -1.35  -0.2517  -1.64  1086  0.261 
1996  -0.1882  -1.88  -0.3108  -3.31  -0.0743  -0.74  -0.2292  -1.58  564  0.275 
1997  -0.0945  -0.93  -0.1569  -1.61  -0.0054  -0.06  -0.1958  -1.32  564  0.311 
1998  -0.056  -0.57  -0.0812  -0.82  -0.1154  -0.91  -0.1411  -0.96  564  0.356 
1999  -0.1424  -1.54  -0.1102  -1.19  -0.0021  -0.02  -0.1567  -0.99  564  0.316 
2000  -0.0834  -0.84  -0.1195  -1.12  0.1127  0.89  -0.0834  -0.55  564  0.266 
2001  0.0132  0.12  -0.1053  -1.05  0.0719  0.55  0.0042  0.03  564  0.278 
2002  -0.0923  -0.94  -0.2807  -2.64  -0.1394  -1.14  -0.0544  -0.32  564  0.264 


















2004  -0.0386  -0.36  -0.2365  -1.81  -0.1306  -0.89  -0.0662  -0.36  564  0.332 
1996  -0.1057  -1.13  -0.071  -0.71  -0.1656  -1.65  -0.0658  -0.36  522  0.369 
1997  -0.1083  -1.22  -0.1594  -1.69  -0.119  -1.17  -0.298  -1.69  521  0.386 
1998  -0.2628  -2.6  -0.152  -1.38  -0.2497  -2.12  -0.0879  -0.46  521  0.353 
1999  -0.1645  -1.71  -0.1016  -0.98  -0.1  -0.91  -0.1721  -0.92  522  0.364 
2000  -0.2237  -2.02  0.1152  0.98  -0.0142  -0.11  -0.2466  -1.17  522  0.393 
2001  -0.2732  -2.33  -0.0659  -0.52  -0.1962  -1.6  -0.2395  -1.1  522  0.321 
2002  -0.3694  -3.76  -0.3149  -3.05  -0.2668  -2.97  -0.2613  -1.77  522  0.352 
















2004  -0.2407  -2.55  -0.0308  -0.27  -0.1679  -1.19  -0.4411  -1.74  522  0.375 
Note: Table presents the results of year-specific regressions of firm profitability (measured as operating profits scaled by gross sales) on 
the full set of right-hand side variables (excluding TOP_LNSHARE) used in Table 3.3. The TOP_OWN variable is interacted with dummy 
variables for each of the four mega-banks, thus allowing separate coefficients for each mega-bank to be estimated. Only the coefficients 
and t statistics for these ownership variables are presented. Eligible firms are those that passed the bond issuing criteria in Japan at least 5 




Graph 1: Major Japanese banks’ assets and profits 
1 
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1  Major banks include the city, trust and former long-term credit banks. Based on annual balance sheet data. Fiscal year.   
2  Shaded areas in millions of yen. Lines are shares of 
total assets, in percent.   
3  As a share of total assets, in percent. Net profits are calculated as the sum (across banks) of gross profits minus the sum of gross expenses, by profit type. 
“Other” includes profits/expenses from loan loss provisioning and write offs. 
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Life insurance companies
Source: Kaigin Financial Data
Millions of shares (lhs); Red lines (rhs) represent percent change since 1996; Fiscal year
Graph 4.1: Shareholding by financial institutions in Japan
 




































































































































































Source: Kaigin Financial Data
Stacked bars (lhs) indicate the number of firms in which the bank is listed in the top ten shareholders
Red lines (rhs) plot the total for each mega-bank as a share of total firms in the Kaigin database
Graph 4.2: Mega-banks' equity portfolios, by sub-bank
 
Graph 2.2 



















































































































































































Source: Kaigin Financial Data
Stacked bars (lhs) indicate the number of firms in which the bank is listed in the top ten shareholders
Red lines (rhs) plot the total for each mega-bank as a share of total firms in the Kaigin database
Graph 4.3: Mega-banks' equity portfolios, by sub-bank Graph 2.3 











































































































































Source: Kaigin Financial Data
Stacked bars (lhs) indicate the number of firms in which the bank is listed in the top ten shareholders
Red lines (rhs) plot the total for each mega-bank as a share of total firms in the Kaigin database
Graph 4.4: Mega-banks' equity portfolios, by sub-bank
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Resona
Source: Kaigin Financial Data, Nikkei NEEDS, Bloomberg
Billions of Yen; Blue bars based on Kaigin shareholding data; Red lines based on banks' accounting data; Fiscal year
Graph 4.5: Market value of mega-banks' equity portfolios
 
Graph 2.5 
Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ 
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1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Stock Price Volitility
Source: Kaigin Financial Data, Nikkei NEEDS, Bloomberg
Sample means (0.01=1%; EPS in Yen)
Eligible firms (522 out of 1086 firms) passed the bond criteria (Table 6.2) five times or more between 1982-1989.
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Inelible firms Eligible firms










1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Ownership by foreign entities
Source: Kaigin Financial Data
Sample means (0.01=1%)
Eligible firms (522 out of 1086 firms) passed the bond criteria (Table 6.2) five times or more between 1982-1989.
Graph 6.2: Firm debt and ownership structure, by bond eligibility
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